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NATURAL LAW, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY-SOME
REFLECTIONS ON THREE TYPES OF THINKING
ABOUT LAW AND JUSTICE
FRIEDRICH KESSLERf
This article deals with the role of a philosophy of natural
law in our efforts to overcome the moral crisis of democracy.
Only a few years ago such a paper hardly would have found
general interest. To be sure, Catholic philosophy of law,
successfully resisting the trend of the times, never did abandon its philosophy of natural law. But outside of the ranks
of Catholic philosophers of law the theory of natural law
was regarded as "an exploded theory, no longer accepted by
any scholar of repute."' Positivism had won the day. Its
victory seemed so complete that many a positivist no longer
felt the need for refuting the critique of natural law philosophers, who insisted on the shortcomings of positivism. Positivism and democracy were taken for granted. Questions
as to the ultimate meaning of law and justice and their interrelationship were no longer asked. Such questions, positivists
never tire to emphasize, cannot be answered scientifically at
all and have, therefore, no place in a science of law. These
problems are metalegal problems.2 The problem of justice,
to quote a modern writer, must therefore be withdrawn
from the insecure realm of subjective judgments of
value [by establishing it] on the firm ground of a
given social order... Justice in this sense is a quality which relates not to the content of a positive order,
but to its application. "Justice" means the maintetJ.U.D. 1928 (Berlin); Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School; Member of flhin6is Bar. The Author wishes to thank Professors Wilber G. Katz, Christian W. Mackauer, and Gerhard E. D. Meyer
of the University of Chicago for many stimulating discussions of the
paper.
ISherger, The Evolution of Modern Liberty (1904) 11.
2"Le fondement de la validitM du droit est en dehors du droit," Triepel
as quoted by Brierly, Force obligatoire du droit international, 23 Recueil
des cours 467, 546 (1929).
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nance of a positive order by applying it conscientiously. It is "justice under the law." 8
From this point of view, natural law is "simply the law of
which a person using the phrase approves" (Pareto). At
best it is a myth or ideology, a conviction strengthened by
the observation that "natural law has never meant the same
thing to all its votaries. ' 4 It is, therefore, impossible to anchor democracy in "first principles" of natural justice. But
this is hardly a defect. On the contrary, democracy, it is
felt by many, can be put on a much safer ground. It is the
inevitable consequence of a technological world and of a
constant expansion of the realm of science.5 This complacent
belief in the self-sufficiency and adequacy of the positivistic
creed is beginning to wear thin as a result of the events of
the last decade. The growth of arbitrary political power,
both a cause and a consequence of the decline of the free
market system, and particularly the rise of fascism. in our
industrial world has made us realize that democratic freedom
is not inevitable. Industrial man living in a mass society has
6
to choose between democracy and totalitarian dictatorship.
No wonder, therefore, that many in their bewilderment turn
to natural law in order to find an answer. One can hear
quite frequently nowadays that
politics without the natural law as an ethical basis
finds ultimate expression in the absolute or totaliSKelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55
Harv. L. Rev. 44, 49 (1941).
4

Seagle, The Quest for Law (1941) 197; Neumann, Types of Natural
Law, 8 Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (1939); Knight, The
Rights of Man and Natural Law, 54 Ethics 124, 127, 135 et seq. (1944).
5Dewey, The Public and its Problems (1927) 110, 146; Feibleman,
Positive Democracy (1940); Meiklejohn, Education Between Two Worlds

(1942) 185.
GSimons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire (1934); Homey, The
Neurotic Personality of our Time (1936); Hayek, Freedom and the
Economic

System

(1940);

Fromm,

Escape from

Freedom

(1941);

Carr, Conditions of Peace (1942); Mannheim, Man and Society in
an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure (3rd
ed. 1942); Laski, Reflections on the Revolution of our Time (1943);
Mannheim, Diagnosis of our Time (1944); Hallowell, The Decline of
Liberalism, 52 Ethics 323 (1942).
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tarian state which denies the traditional determinants of morality and makes the fiat of the state the
moral law.7
Democracy with its institutions--we are told--can only be
justified with moral conviction if we regard-it as the realizatidin of the natural law,postulate of the fundamental equality
of an. (On any other ground democracy can at best be
'defended as the lesser evil, a position which does not carry
ito much weight in times whose ideal is efficiency,). Justice,
"debunked" as a mere bourgeois and intellectualistic conception by the believers in a government of force by the elite,
lis to be anchored in the first principles of natural law if
jistice is to be more than an empty word, and so has law,
to be' not merely the majority of votes."
In times like ours, philosophy is no longer a matter of polite
discussion. The claims of natural law philosophy, therefore,
should be considered seriously. But no less seriously should
be taken the challenge that the renaissance of natural law
philosophy is nothing but escapism, one of the many symptoms
. !'new failure of nerve" 9-a phenomenon as characteristic
for .oun time as for the centuries preceding the rise of Christianity, so brilliantly described by Jacob Burckhardt and Gilbert Murray.
It goes without saying that an exhaustive discussion of
natural law doctrine within the compass of a short article is
impossible. The literature on the subject is enormous. To
7Ryan and Boland, Catholic Principles of Morality (1940) 1.
8
Sorel, Reflections on Violence (Hulme's tr.) passi?m See Lenin's
famous statement: "Democracy is a mere bourgeois superstition." Some
modern writers try to meet this challenge by proclaiming that the belief
in - 'democracy must- be just as fanatical as that in authoritarianism.
"Democracy requires the same unconscious belief in its rationality as
does science. To question the validity of democracy is to disbelieve

in it for we must not even be aware of our belief if it is to be profound enough to mean anything."

Feibleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at

p; '124.
9

Hook, The New Failure of Nerve, 10 Partisan Review 1 et seq.

1

(1943).
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avoid repetition, I should like to take-up only one aspect of
the whole problem and discuss the contribution- natural law
philosophy has made towards its solution: the relationship
between law, justice and democracy.
To'appreciate the achievements of natural law philosophy
in our field of investigation, it seems well to contrast its
thesis with those of two other ways of thinking about law
and justice: objective idealism on the one hand and positivism
on the other. This is all the more profitable since natural
law'"philosophy has tried to take an intermediate position
between the two other forms of thinking.
OBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Plato's presentation of objective idealism is still unsurpassed. I take him, therefore, as its representative. Plato's
philosophy of law is the result of his firm belief in the existence of absolute values, or, more accurately, his faith in"
the reality of ideas, as the cause of .true being and true
knowledge.10
The perfection of the state-according to Plato--:depends
upon -its realization of the idea of the "good," the eentral
principle of morality and of the ideal state. The "good" is
open to man's reason. But since it is the highest knowledge,
it is only shared by the "gods" and very few men. These
few are the natural rulers of the state. The highest knowledge in matters of state is justice. It is the true guarantee
of the harmony of the perfect state. Justice in the perfect
state does not mean merely "giving everyone his due." It is
the active duty of each citizen to realize himself in the station of life'to which he is called by his abilities. It demands
"from each according to his abilities." Justice, therefore, in
contrast to democratic theory praising the happy versatility
of the democratic man (Pericles' funeral oration) means divi1OIts presuppositions are given
passage in 10 Laws 889-which is
about the relationship of nature
Philosophie der Aufklilrung (1932)

in Timaeus "51 and in a beautiful
Plato's answer to the sophist theory
and convention. See Cassirer, Die
314 et seq.

HeinOnline -- 19 Tul. L. Rev. 35 1944-1945

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

sion of labor as a principle of government.1 1 To put an end
to irresponsibility parading as freedom, the harmony of the
state is to be achieved by establishing a hierarchical order.
Justice, therefore, does not mean equality among members
of a community who are unequal by nature. 12 The art of
government demands an understanding of the reasons for the
order imposed, but only on the part of the ruler13 Censorship
and ideologies are, therefore, proper instruments of government. The state is not based on a social contract in which
the individual forsakes his natural right to do injustice in
exchange for the state's protection against being acted upon
unjustly.
The legitimacy of individual strivings is judged by their
contribution to the common weal. The community as a whole
gives meaning and content to the life of each individual citizen. The individual is not free to think what he pleases. It
is his duty to find out what he should think in order to do his
part for the realization of the good. But this does not mean
that the interests of the individual are completely subordinated to that of the community. On the contrary, the virtuousness of the citizen depends upon the perfection of the
state.14 The antagonism between individual and community
is resolved because individual and general will have become
identical. This applies to rulers and subjects alike. In the
ideal state, the ruler does not abuse the state to his own
ends. Plato is quite explicit in this respect: tyranny is the
worst form of government.
114 Republic 433.

12Aristotle's theory of equality, according to the Fifth Book of the
Nicomachean Ethics, is based on the same presupposition: only in the

field of "corrective" justice equality means arithmetical equality, while
in th6 field of "distributive" justice, it means geometrical equality.
'5 Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel (1935) 43.
I am greatly indebted to this monograph. See also Barker, Greek Political Theory, Plato and his Predecessors (2nd ed. 1925); Stenzel,
Wissenschaft und Staatsgesinnung bbi Platon (1927); 2 Jaeger, Paideia:
The Ideals of Greek Culture (1949) 198 et seq.; Kelsen, Platonic Justice, 48 Ethics 367 (1938).
144 Republic 435, 445.
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Only the fundamental principles of justice governing the
state's life need be laid down in the constitution of the perfect state. The details should remain open. Besides, detailed regulations become more and more unnecessary with
the progress of education. 15 Abundance of law is a symptom
of ignorance and lack of education. Furthermore, law, because of its generality, makes for rigidity and inflexibility.
It behaves like "an obstinate and ignorant tyrant."
The law cannot comprehend exactly what is noblest
or most just, or at once ordain what is best, for all.
The differences between man and actions, and the
endless irregular movements of human things do not
admit of any universal or single rule. No art whatsoever can lay down a rule that can last foreverthat we must admit.16
Therefore, "no law or ordinance whatever has the right to
'1 7
sovereignty over true knowledge.
Law, as far as it is necessary in the perfect state, is just
law. It is not merely convention, the sole result of temporary
expedience and compromise.18 The just law of the perfect
state flows from the principle of reason (Logos) by a process of logic (dialectic) and is therefore open to the speculative mind.' 9 By its very nature, the just law owes its validity
to the authority of reason and not to the fact that it is expressed as the command of a sovereign power. The tension
between will (power) and reason, law and justice, authority
and liberty, which constantly threatens the equilibrium of the
second-best state is, therefore, resolved in the harmony of
the perfect state. Thus the political philosophy of the Republic contains the most challenging criticism of liberalism and
democracy.
15Id. at p. 425.

16Statesman, 294.
179 Laws 875.
18
In the second-best state, law is the true sovereign. 9 Laws 875.
19 Foster, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 113 et seq.
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Though such interpretation hardly does justice to .the greatness of the Republic, it has become the fashion to denounce
its authoritarian and aristocratic , hilosophy as . disguised
fascism and to argue that, shocked by the paralyzing effects
of a constant class war within a decadent Athenian democracy, Plato dreamt that "between the dictatorship of the
Left and the dictatorship of the Right, there was -a third
revolutionary alternative, the dictatorship of the _.yvirtuous
right.' "20 To corroborate this interpretation, evidence is
brought forward, not only in the form of Plato's own political activities from which his great treatise on justice can
hardly be divorced, but also in the form of the Plato renaissance on the continent, especially among political philosophers
preparing the way for fascism and Nazism. On the other
hand, there are political philosophers who have used his ar21
guments to defend a dictatorship of the "virtuous left.1
Thus, the political philosophy of the Republic has, come to
mean the ideology katexochen of totalitarianism, equally useful to defend a dictatorship of the "virtuous right" or of the
"virtuous left." In terms of this analysis, the Plato renaissance is not difficult to understand: the two world vars separated by a peace which brought the great depression have
made Plato's message intelligible to us. Like Plato--to quote
a modern writer-we live "in a transitional period, and it is
not surprising to find that once again men's minds have been
'22
turned to Plato, philosopher of transition.
20

CrossMan, Plato Today (1939) 6. On the political aspects of' (objective) idealism, see Kelsen, Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929)
100 et seq.,. 118, 119; Knight, Ethics and Economic Reform, II Idealism
and Marxism, 6 Economica (N. s.) 296 (1939).
21
The political philosophy of Leonard Nelson is an outstanding exMdrxists, to be
ample. See Nelson, Politics and Education (1928).
sure, in general have been extremely hostile to Plato's idealism. See
Winspear, Genesis of Plato's Thought (1940); Crowther, Social Relations of Science (1941) 66, 279, 578. Still, their political goal has many
aspects similar to Plato's political philosophy, e. g., Plato's view on

-the function of the law can be paralleled with Marx's views on the
function of the state. On the connection between Plato afid the Enlightenment, see Cassirer, op. cit. supra note 10, at p. 313 et seq.
22
Crossman, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 10. In justice to Plato, it

should be remembered that through the Politics of Aristotle the "con-
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Be that as it may, in any case, the philosophy of the. Re.
public is radically opposed to that philosophical creedalready
defended by Socrates' great opponent Protagoras, which..has
come to be known as positivism.
POSITMSM
According to the philosophers of liberalism, positivism is
the philosophy par excellence of liberal democracy.2 Positivism is not troubled by the opposition: perfect state ,ver~us
second-best state. The perfect state of justice, envisaged.in
the Republic as a constant challenge to human aspirations,
has completely dropped out of the picture. Law and justice
no longer form oppositions. In the words of Hobbes, "no
law can be unjust. ' 24 Because of the dangers inherent in any
sort of perfectionism, the quest for the absolutely just law
guiding the morality of the citizen in its totality is given up.
Therefore, in contrast to the philosophy of the Republic proclaiming that law should be replaced by justice, law has become the measure of just and unjust: "Mensur boni et Mli
in omni civitate lex est."25 Consequently, it is just i6 obey the
law. And law in this connection means positive, I. e., enacted
law. It derives its validity not from the fact that it is-lased
on right reason but that "it is a word by him that by right
26
has command over others."1
For many of its critics, particularly philosophers of-natural
law relying on the quotations just given, positivism (no- less
stitutionalism" of Plato's Laws has deeply influenced the political
thought of the West.

Nor should it be forgotten that Protagoras, as

Plato presents him, proclaims the faith in the common man with an
appeal still unsurpassed. Protagoras, 322.
23

Compare Plato's Theaetetus (Cornford tr. 1935) 172A: "But, in

that field I am speaking of-in right and wrong and matters -of religion-people are ready to affirm that none of these things is natural,
with a reality of its own, but rather that the public decision becomes
true at the moment when it is made and remains true so long as the
decision stands; and those who do not argue altogether as Protagoras
does carry on their philosophy on these lines."
•24 Hobbes, Leviathan (1651 ed.) ch. 30, p. 182.
251d. ch. 46, p. 369.
201&. ch.

15, p. 80..
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than Plato's objective idealism) may easily be abused to legitimize the arbitrary rule of a totalitarian dictatorship. But, as
they argue,,a dictatorship defended in terms of positivistic
arguments, is even worse than the tyranny of the intellect
envisaged in the Republic. It need not even be tempered by
reason: power has swallowed up justice and right; authority,
freedom; and the will of the sovereign is law because he has
the might to compel obedience and punish disobedience, and
for no other reason. To strengthen this interpretation of
positivism, its opponents never tire of quoting Hobbes' "authority not wisdom makes a law" or the statement of Bentham, regarded as equally damaging, "whatever persons exercise supreme power, those persons have the right to exercise
it."27

Liberals are quite ready to concede that totalitarian dictatorships and theocratic forms of government have been defended with positivistic arguments. 2 Still, as they insist, a
positivistic philosophy of law is indispensable for liberal democracy, as a matter of fact is the philosophy of a democracy
which regards freedom as the fundamental social ideal: the
postulate that it is "just to obey the law" has to be set against
the -background of the postulates of a "government of laws and
not of men" and of the separation of law and morality, proclaimed by liberalism, without which liberty and the moral
freedom and dignity of the individual are impossible. 29 Since,
to paraphrase A. D. Lindsay, there is no commonly accepted
authority to say what is right, it cannot be argued that we are
27Id. (Latin ed. 1652) ch. 26, p. 133; Hobbes, A Dialogue Between a
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (1681) in
6 English Works (Molesworth ed. 1840) 5; Bentham, Fragments on
Government, 100.
28
Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science, 8 Economica (N. s.) 9
et seq., 119 et seq., 281 et seq. (1941). On the positivism of de Maistre,

Donoso Cortez and Stahl, see Neumann, loc. cit. supra note 4, at p. 349
et seq.
291,'.. it is a high and not a low conception of morality which recog-

nizes that the state cannot enforce all men's duties, that its main business is to maintain liberties." Lindsay, The Modern Democratic State
(1943)

89.
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to obey law because the law is morally right8 0 But it is equally
true that the law can exercise its security function and protect
liberty only if it is obeyed by the members of the polity irrespective of their likes and dislikes. Therefore, "we obey
the law not necessarily because we think the law is right, but
because we think it right to obey the law."31 Furthermore, to
safeguard moral progress "the interests in which moral values
and social institutions are rooted" constantly have to be exposed to the open light of criticism and free discussion.32
Finally, sovereignty is not mere might, but only supreme authority exercised by the people. Thus, in the context of the
philosophy of liberalism, legal positivism has acquired a nonauthoritarian meaning. It is the philosophy of the liberal and
democratic Rechtsstaat, in which the "fiat of the state" is
not the moral law, and as such forms a genuine opposition
to the philosophy of law of the Republic.
A good deal of the history of positivism since Protagoras,
liberals insist, has consisted in efforts to achieve and strengthen the Rechsstaat by means of a positivistic legal philosophy.
A tendency in this direction can even be found in the political
philosophy of Hobbes, one of the founders of modern positivism. His positivism is less authoritarian than his critics
make it out to be, provided his writings are read in the light
of their historical context. We have it on good authority that
Hobbes' philosophy wvas quite revolutionary for his time.
Charles II said of the Leviathan, "I have never read a book
which contained so much sedition, treason, and impiety."3 3 It
is true, we owe to Hobbes the famous motto of all positivism,
"authority not wisdom makes a law," but he also wrote "the
30d at p. 85.
S 1McIver, The Modern State (1926) 154. "La liberti est le droit de
faire tout ce que les lois permettent: et si un citoyen pouvoit falre ce
qu'eUes dcfendent, il n'auroit plus do libertg, parce que le autres
auroient tout de ingme ce pouvoir." Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois

XI, ch. 3.
32

Stocks, Philosophy of Democracy (1939); Hook, The Philosophical

Presuppositions of Democracy, 52 Ethics 275, 380 (1942).
3SNeumann, loc. cit. supra, note 4, at p. 356.
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people rule in all governments."3 4 Just as the power of Plato's
ruler -is controlled by his reason, so is the power of Hobbes'
sovereign- not an end in itself, but only a means to preserve
law "aid order and to end the bellum omnium contra omnes
prevailing in the state of nature.
. . . The estate of Man can never be without some
incommodity or other; and ... the greatest, that in
any forme of Government can possibly happen to
the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect
of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of
. Inasterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and
revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure.
of Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any
delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or
weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, con"Isteth their own'strength and glory ...35
'The 'duty of a sovereign," again in Hobbes' words, "consist,"in tli6 gbod government of the people.

36

Civitas enim

U4Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments, 2 English Works (Molesworth ed.
1840) 100, 160; see also Hobbes, De Give VII, 5: "Qui coierunt ad
-ciiiititm ig6ndam pene' eo ipso quod coierunt, Democratia sunt." His
famous statement that "no law can be unjust" ceases to be shocking

if read in its context. "The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and
all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one
of th people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say
is unjust. _.; For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised)

is not to. bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and
keep thei ii such a motion, as 'not to hurt themselves by their own
impetfiois desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not
to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law
that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good.
A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the
Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so.
For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is
a weak. Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whosb

Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will." Hobbes, op. cit.
supra
note 24, ch. 30, p. 182.
35
Hobbes, op. cit. supra note 24, ch. 18, p. 94.
36
Hobbes, De Corpore Politico (1640) 213. The preceding discussion
of Hobbes is greatly indebted to Lamprecht, Hobbes and Hobbism, 34
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non sui: sea. civium- causa instituta est. Since the "end of
obedienceis protection," the subjects are free when: the sov-.
ereign can-no longer exercise these functions. 3 7 Hobbes' ideas
on freedoui of trade are no less outspoken. Governmental interference should be kept at a minimum.88
Justice for Hobbes means security, particularly security of
the intitution of property, created by the sovereign power
"in order to preserve the public peace,"3 9 and, due to the aggressiveness of human nature, law and authority are its essential: and indispensable prerequisites. Their utility is to be
regarded--as their ground. Law and authority alone make
liberfy,- security of human enterprise and "the commodity of
living possible." Justice begins only where law exists.
In view of these utilitarian aspects of Hobbes' political
philosophy, it is not altogether warranted to regard him as
a philosopher, of strict authoritarianism and even less of strict
totalitarianism. Rather, it is a good deal more accurate to say
that Hobbes' writings-full of contradictions as they are-.
symbolize the beginning of the bourgeois era. 40 With the
philosophy of Hobbes, the long intellectual and political process begins which culminated in the writings and achievements
of the great utilitarian philosophers of -the nineteenth century, who exercised such a great influence over their century.
Hobbes' authoritarianism, despite its flavor of social despotism and its tendency to "reduce ethics to politics or economics" (Lindsay), was not altogether foreign to the way of
4x
thinking, of the head of the utilitarian school, Bentham.
Am. Pol. Science Rev. 31 (1940). See also Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (1936) 108 et seq.; Neumann, loc. cit. supra note 4,

at pp. 346, 355 et seq.
37

Hobbes, op. cit. supra note 24, ch. 21, p. 114.

s3Hobbes, Elements of Law (Tonnies ed. 1928) Part II, ch. 9, § 4.
39Hobbes, op. cit. supra note 24, ch. 18, p. 91.
4

ODuguit, Trait6 de Droit constitutionel I, p. 31: "Au Xviia sihcle
Hobbes et Jurien peuvent etre considerds commes les reprdsentants types
des doctrines ddmocratiques." See further' Menzel, Demokratie und Weltanschauung, -2 Zeitschrift ffir ffentliches Recht 701, 709 et seq. (1921).
41
0n the Utilitarians, see Haldvy, Growth of Philosophical Radicalism
(1928); with regard to the point'discussed in the text, see id. at p. 488
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On the contrary, Bentham took over Hobbes' idea that the
political obligation can be based only on the enlightened selfinterest of the individual; he also regarded (particularly in
his youth) an authoritarian form of government indispensable
for the introduction of the many social reforms which he
thought necessary. How else could the petty resistance of
common law lawyers to even the smallest legal reforms be
overcome?
Influenced by Hume, Bentham held Hobbes' political philosophy even compatible with the theories of Adam Smith,
to whom he was indebted not merely in his thinking about
economics. Consequently, borrowing from both, Bentham
tried to reconcile the principle of authority underlying the
legal philosophy of Hobbes with the principles of economic
liberty forming the basis of the system of Adam Smithaccording to whom the existing division of labor and the automatic mechanism of exchanges can better be trusted to bring
about a harmony of interests among the members of the community than governmental interference.42 This "reconciliation" was attempted in the following manner: the final cause
or purpose for which government ought to exist, as he and
his school argued, is the furtherance of the common weal
to the greatest possible extent. To achieve this end, no benevolent and enlightened despotism, as envisaged by Hobbes, is
et seq.; Myrdal, Das Politische Element in der National~konomischen
Doktrinbildung, Aus dem Schwedischen iibersetzt von Mackenroth (1932)
43 et seq. As to Hobbes' influence on James Mill, see 2 Stephen, The
English Utilitarians (1900) 74 et seq.; on Austin, see 3 id. 321 et seq.
On the connection between the Utilitarians and natural law philosophy,
see further 1 icd. 303 et seq.; Schumpeter, Epochen der Dogmen-und
Methodengeschichte, 1 Grundriss der Sozialoekonomik 19, 27 et seq.
(1914).
42
Viner, Adam Smith and Laissez Faire, 35 Journal of Political Economy 198, 208, 214 et seq. (1927) ; Bittermann, Adam Smith's Empiricism
and the Law of Nature, 48 Journal of Political Economy 487, 703 (1940).
Hume, who was a liberal in his economic philosophy, but a critic of
the natural rights myth, constitutes the connecting link between Hobbes
and Bentham as well as between Smith and Bentham. The exact extent
to which Smith was influenced by Hume on the one hand and the natural
rights theory on the other is still open to controversy. See the articles
by Viner and Bittermann mentioned above:
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necessary. Since each individual, properly educated, is the
best judge of his own interest, the principle of laissez faire
should form the guide of governmental policy, once the institutions that make liberty effective have been created.-I Liberty thus means, positively, respect for the moral, intellectual
and economic autonomy of the individual; negatively, freedom
from arbitrary government interference. Any interference,
to quote Mills' Liberty, is arbitrary if it has any other purpose than "the prevention of harm to others." The own good
of the citizens, "either physical or moral, is no sufficient warrant." Liberty, according to Bentham, is a
branch of security: personal liberty is security
against a certain species of injuries which affect
the person: As to what is called political liberty, it
is another branch of security-security against in44
justice from the ministers of government.
Thus, the function of law should be limited to the "care of
security" which is the "object of justice" (Adam Smith). In
the scale of social values, security rates higher than equality
with the Benthamites; due to the insufficiency of the factors
of production, as they argued with Malthus, an equal distribution of property would only lead to universal poverty. 45 Law,
therefore, is the minimum interference necessary to protect
the interests of the individual, particularly his property interests, -the indispensable prerequisite of genuine freedom,and a means of enabling men to deal securely and efficiently
with one another. Coercion, in other words, is only to -be used
to prevent coercion by individuals and private groups. All re43Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy, 3 Works of Jeremy Bentham (Bowring ed. 1843) 33, 43; see further Keynes, The End of

Laissez-Faire (1926).
44

Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Theory of Legislation (Hil-

dreth's tr. from French of Etienne Dumont 1896) 97.
45
Bentham, op. cit. supra note 44, at pp. 97 et seq., 119 et seq.; Hal6vy,
op. cit. supra note 41, at p. 490. See further Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 Yale L. Jour. 864 (1932); McKeon, The Development of the Concept of Property in Political Philosophy: A Study of
the Background of the Constitution, 48 Ethics 297 (1938).
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lations ought to rest on mutual free consent within limits set
by formal "rules of the game." 46 Contract is the perfect form
of obligation.
The for fi of government which is best able to realize the
greatest happiness princile and at the same time least likely
to impose arbitrary restraints on the individual is "democracy.
The opiiioh of the majority can be regarded as reprdsentative
of the interest of the greatest number. And, what is of the
utmost importance, since it safeguards the postulate of equal-'
ity under the law, democracy does not exercise whatever
restraint becomes necessary except by known: general laws
47
created by the democratic process.
In this way, elements and intentions of the natural law
theory of the Enlightenment have been preserved, though in
a transmuted form in the philosophy of utilitarianism. This
aspect of the utilitarian creed-obscured by the fact that the
institution of private property and freedom of contract are
vindicated on utilitarian grounds-can hardly be overemphasized. To be sure, Benthamism is free from "higher law"
principles and from a theory of "natural rights" in the Lockian sense. But this does not mean that it is without normative and critical elements. On the contrary, the greatest hap.
piness principle constantly inspired Benthamites to test the
desirability of existing positive laws in terms of their social
utility.48 Furthermore, the negative role of compulsion assigned to the state is meaningful only if we take into account
the basic presupposition of the Benthamite system: the firm
belief that in the context of genuine liberal and democratic
institutions, the individual serving his enlightened self-interest is also serving the interest of the community. Therefore,
46

47

Knight, loc. cit. supra note 20, at p. 17.

0n the "rule of law" see Dicey, Law of the Constitution (Wade's
9th ed. 1939) 183 et seq.
48
The social ethics of utilitarianism appear clearly, for instance, in
Benthan's discussion of equality (op. cit. supra note 44, at p. 119 et
seq.), in Mill's theory that virtue is an essential means to happiness,
and his discourse on the Connexion between Justice and Utility (Utilitarianism, ch. 5).
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individual and cooperative action left unrestrained in family,
church and market will not lessen the freedom and dignity
of man but will secure the highest possible social justice.
Thus, utilitarian positivism could indeed become a non-authoritarian philosophy of law, reflecting the individualistic
spirit of liberal bourgeoisie which identifies virtue with enlightened self-interest, and to which Plato's Republic is a
horrible nightmare because it subjects all members of the
community to the merciless tyranny of a Utopia. To safeguard the moral autonomy of the individual-the "subjective
element," as Hegel called it in his critique of Plato's Republic
-liberals are willing to pay a heavy price: the liberal state
is perpetually falling short of the best, and conflicts between
individual and general will are, therefore, inevitable. Still,
in the interest of liberty and security, the law that is and the
law that ought to be must be rigidly separated.4 9 This applies
even to "bad" laws:
Known general laws, however bad, interfere less
with freedom than decisions based on no previously
known rule. Where such decisions are frequent a
man can never know what liberty he has, and liberty
is only valuable when we know that we have it.50
Justice, in this context, means equality under the law, indeed.
493Besides,-to quote Adam Smith's famous critique of Quesnai: "If a
nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and
perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever
have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature
has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad
effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner as it

has done-in the natural body, for remedying those of his sloth and
intemperance.:'

The Wealth of Nations (Modern Library Ed. 1937)

638. See also Mourant, The Physiocratic Conception of Natural Law
(Chicago Dissertation 1943).
5
oMaitland, A Historical Sketch of Liberty and Equality, 1 Collected
Papers (Fisher ed. 1911) 81. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy,
because in ;most matters it is more important that the applicable rule

of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . This is commonly
true even where the error is a matter of serious concern." Brandeis,

HeinOnline -- 19 Tul. L. Rev. 47 1944-1945

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

It was of untold importance for the ideology of liberal positivism that its assertions were "confirmed" by its political
achievements and by the triumph of the capitalistic development. The legal philosophy which regards "security from
injury" as the ultimate end of law and justice became the
powerful weapon of political reformers in their struggle for

democratic institutions. Utilitarianism overcame the ideology,
so ably defended by Blackstone, that the traditional English
law was identical with the law of nature and, therefore, perfect; in the name of Utilitarianism, the English middle class
succeeded in bringing about that change of the law that was
necessary to establish a liberal democracy. 5 And with the
development of democratic forms of government and the resulting diffusion of power, Hobbes' idea that law is a command of a sovereign lost its unpleasant totalitarian implications. Under the democratic system of government, every
citizen is a sovereign. As a matter of fact, power, sovereignty
and command gradually ceased to be key words of positivistic
philosophy, despite the efforts of Austin to restore their importance.5 2 Dewey's attitude is typical in this respect. "Rules
J. in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406, 52 Sup.
Ct. 443, 447, 76 L. Ed. 815 (1932).
51
"The teacher who could lead England in the path of reform must
not talk of the social contract, of natural rights, of rights of man, or of
liberty, fraternity, and equality. Bentham and his disciples precisely
satisfied this requirement." Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England
(1905) 125 et seq., 170; Becker, Declaration of Independence (1922)
235-36. Thus, the critical attitude of Bentham as a reformer towards
natural law was the result of two factors: Blackstone's'use of natural
law theory to defend the status quo, and the fact that the natural rights
theory was discredited by the development of the French revolution.
52
"Government officials in particular are supposed to have no 'power'
(and hardly any existence) as individuals but to act exclusively as
agents of the law." Knight, loo. cit. supra, note 20, at p. 299. Even
Austin's theory of sovereignty is not free from the influence of-democratic theory. Austin by defining the sovereign as "the person or persons who habitually receive obedience of the bulk of members of society"
makes the consent ,of the governed the ultimate basis of law and sovereignty. Krabbe, Die Lehre von der Rechtssouverfnitit (1906) 74,
150. On Locke, see Neumann, Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im
Recht der Buergerlichen Gesellschaft, 6 Zeitschrift fiur Sozialforschung
542 et seq. (1937).
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of law are active forces only as are banks which confine the
flow of a stream, and are commands only in the sense in
' 3
which banks command a current."
The achievements of capitalism with its enormous increase
in the productivity of labor had a profound influence on the
meaning of the two fundamental concepts of the utilitarian
philosophy of justice: freedom and security. The meaning
of these symbols has undergone many changes, reflecting the
various stages of capitalistic development. For the youthful
Bentham, the state .was not the neutral state of Locke, but
an active state vigorously introducing social reforms in the
interest of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
If this was ever generally accepted, it was soon forgotten
because of the lusty growth of capitalism and its enormous
achievements. So long as the capitalistic system was constantly able to expand production and employment, it provided a setting for both freedom and security, and, as a result,
the confidence in Locke's theory of natural rights remained
4
unshaken.
The conviction that a continuous advance is the only guarantee of security was reflected in the attitude of the community with regard to the uneven development of the common
law, particularly the American common law, which was unable to keep pace with the rapid advance of industrialization.
The fact that rule was competing with counter-rule and ex55
ception and that a legal science was very slow in developing
was hardly regarded as a serious difficulty. On the contrary,
business during the process of constant expansion found the
53

Dewey, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 52.

54

Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27
Ill. L. Rev. 629, 648 (1933); Palmer, Benthamisni in England and
America, 35 Am. Political Science Rev. 855 (1941). On early economic
theory in this country, see the symposium by Henrich, Handlin, Hartz
and Heath, American Laissez Faire, The Tasks of Economic History
(supplemental issue to Jour. of Econ. Hist. 1943) 51; Grampp, Mercantilism and Laissez Faire in American Political Discussion, 17871829 (Chicago Dissertation 1944)
55

(not yet published).

Cohen, Law and Scientific Method, in Handbook of the Association
of American Law Schools, 28 et seq. (1927).
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lack of rationality and the many gaps in the law rather to
its advantage-which seems to prove that capitalism as long
as it does not reach maturity does not need a highly rationalized legal system. 6
But with the gradual slowing up of the process of capitalistic expansion, this attitude began to change. The waste
inevitably inherent in the wild growth of the American common law could no longer go unnoticed. Serious attempts to
remedy the situation were the result. But, as the feeling
prevailed that there was nothing basically wrong with the
world a victorious bourgeoisie had created, the legal profession was particularly ill-equipped for its task of bringing the
law in line with the social and economic development. All
that had to be done-it was felt-was to consolidate the gains
and bring the house in order. Certainty and consistency of
the law and predictability of decisions became therefore the
sole remedies advocated by the emerging new school of thought
within the legal profession: the school of analytical jurisprudence. To achieve its aim various devices, such as codification or restatement of the common law, were tried or suggested. Great efforts were made at perfecting the rule of
stare decisis and at extracting out of the existing case law
the basic principles and conceptions applicable in each field.
What the analytical jurists failed to realize was their "legalistic?' approach, bent as it was upon building up a rational
and harmonious legal system (formal rationality), inevitably
forced them into higher and higher, and therefore lifeless,
abstractions, the more the increasing instability of the underlying social system led to conflicting decisions and theories.
"Abstractions and generalizations ran riot."57 This change
in the prevailing climate of opinion deeply affected the judicial process. In the words of Oliphant, there was a "shift
from stare decisis to stare dictis." "Courts in their decisions
56

Weber, Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionsoziologie I (1922)
et seq.; Mannheim, Man and Society (1940) 180.
57

437

0liphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, in Handbook of the Association

of American- Law Schools, 61, 70 (1927).
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began to talk less and less about what prior courts had actually done in ordering men's affairs and more and more
about the universals they had promulgated"-a process greatly encouraged by the inflationary output of case law which
made it impossible to study precedents with the care previous
generations of lawyers had exhibited. This "legalistic" attitude had still another more serious aspect. It prevented
many a liberal member of the bench from attaining a real
understanding of the constellation of social forces and the
struggle for political and economic power. As a result, "conservative" judges had an easy task of writing their political
and economic philosophy into the law; "the spirit of the common law" became "too neutral for an effective offensive
against practices injurious to the weaker elements of so5
ciety." 8
However, it took more than one generation of critics before
the shortcomings of the conceptualistic approach were adequately realized and a new school of thought emerged.
At first lawyers who were struck by the discrepancy between the teachings of the school of analytical jurisprudence
and the living law merely criticized the analytical jurists for
their naive technique in trying to achieve legal certainty;
they suggested the application of a more scientific approach.
The next generation of critics went a good deal further. To
them inconsistencies and conflicting rules within the legal
system are not necessarily the result of a wrong application
of fundamental principles, but frequently are expressions of
competing tendencies of social justice struggling for recognition. As to many of the "conflicting" decisions--the critics
suggested-the difficulty was with the system of classifications proposed by legal theory rather than with the decisions
actually reached by the courts.
58

Freund, Standards of American Legislation (1917) 71. Even
Holmes, who is regarded as the father of American legal realism, could
not always free himself of a legalistic approach. Boudin, Justice Holmes

and his World, 3 Lawy. Guild Rev. 24, 27 (1943).
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With this approach a new sociological school of thought
arose. Legal realism, as it called itself, has tremendously
influenced the way of thinking of modern lawyers about the
role of law in our society. Its criticism of analytical jurisprudence has made us realize that preoccupation with efforts
at making the law consistent and predictable (at a high level
of abstraction) may afford an easy escape from a more important task: namely, of constantly testing out the desirability, efficiency and fairness of inherited legal rules and
institutions in terms of the present needs- of society. Legal
realism has given us a deeper understanding of the judicial
process and of the art of-judicial government. This has been
put by Holmes in an admirable phrase:
It is the merit of the common law that it decides
the case first and determines the principles afterwards. Looking at the forms of logic it might be inferred that when you have a minor premise and a
conclusion, there must be a major, which you are
also prepared then and there to assert. But in fact
lawyers, like other men, frequently see well enough
how they ought to decide on a given state of facts
without being very clear as to the ratio decidendi59
This realistic approach further enabled the critics of
analytical jurisprudence to view ir its historical perspective
the chief tenet of positivism which claims that the function
of law is to be limited to "the care of security." This dogma,
as they realized, grew up in an historical period when theconstellation of economic and social forces was favorable to
the development of a free enterprise system. For the founders of liberal positivism, the enemy of free enterprise and
liberalism was an all powerful state. A liberal economic system, as they assumed, would maintain and even improve the
moral, political and legal institutions of society. The founders
of liberalism did not have the vision to foresee that the capi59

]Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1
(1870).
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talistic system has within itself forces which, if unchecked,
will inevitably change a free enterprise system into monopoly
capitalism and a liberal democracy into a pluralistic society
which knows nothing but divided loyalties. Once liberal democracy ceases to be a living force, positivism, despite its
insistence on the strict separation of the moral and the legal
and its identification of justice with legality and order, is
unable to guarantee liberty. It is not the "rule of law" as
such which guarantees liberty but only the rule of law within
the larger framework of a liberal democracy full of strength
and vitality. 60 Positivists in identifying justice with legality,
without articulatingthe basic premise of their creed, commit
the tragic error of taking a liberal democracy for granted. In
a time of transition like ours, the inherent weakness of this
kind of positivism becomes apparent, and the doctrine that it
is not wisdom but authority that makes a law becomes a
dangerous slogan.
We begin to realize that positivism as such, due to its incompleteness, is a neutral and politically ambiguous philosophy of law, which fits equally well into a totalitarian dictatorship. Benthamite positivism was protected against this
danger because, as we have seen, it was part of a philosophy
whose main tenet was the greatest happiness principle. Bentham and his school could therefore afford to put strong emphasis on the security function of law and justice. On the
other hand, overemphasis on the desirability of law and order in times of moral and economic crisis may help to create
a climate of opinion favorable to fascism. It is easy to prove
this point by calling attention to the fact that Hitler came
into power without violating the principles of legality. Positivists who claim that justice means justice under the law
60

Clark, The Function of Law in a Democratic Society, 9 Univ. Chi. L.

Rev. 893 et seq. (1942); Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and

Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.
Jour. 208 (1943). For a discussion of the rule of law dogma, see
Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (1943) 285 et seq.; Neumann,

loc. cit. supra note 52; Robson, Dicey's Law of the Constitution: A Review, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 205 (1939).
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have been quite helpless when confronted with the spectacle
of a weak and decadent democracy transforming itself into
a totalitarian dictatorship by means of the democratic process. This experience accounts for the widespread feeling
that there must be something fundamentally wrong with a
legal philosophy which has nothing to say when law turns
into unlaw.
Challenged by this reaction and by the ever-increasing tension between political democracy and capitalism, many of the
modern realists have devoted their energies not to efforts at
improving analytical theories, but to the task of rebuilding
our democracy in accordance with the new social needs. They
have joined the New Deal and its agencies, abandoning Locke's
idea of the neutral state and returning to Bentham's state
of social reforms in the interest of the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. Law to them is more than an argumentative technique, as some radical positivists claim. It is a unified attempt at freedom and social justice.
But, philosophers of natural law will insist, this brand of
realism is no longer positivism. It draws heavily on the natural law postulate of the natural equality and dignity of man
and is in reality a philosophy of natural law. Intellectual
honesty should require the advocates of social and political
reforms to admit it. Such an admission-we are told-would
bring their social philosophy in line with the great moral tradition of western civilization and, therefore, only strengthen
its position. Thus, -it becomes inevitable to examine the basic
tenets of natural law philosophy.
NATURA

LAW PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy of natural law takes an intermediate position between the two legal philosophies mentioned before.
In contrast to objective idealism and positivism, natural law
philosophy gives to the legal order a dualistic and not a
monistic structure. All philosophies of natural law teach the
belief in the existence of universally valid principles of jus-
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tice which are anchored in man's social and moral-rational
nature.0 ' These principles of justice find their "concretization" in positive laws. Natural law philosophy thus shares
with objective idealism the belief in the existence of eternal
moral values; still it has been realistic enough-even during
the Enlightenment-to forsake a monistic theory of the moral-legal universe, however great the temptation to move in
62
this direction.
By working out a dualistic philosophy of law, natural law
philosophy has tried to combine the virtues of objective
idealism and the realism of positivism and, since the early
Middle Ages, to reach a synthesis of the two main streams
of our cultural heritage: of our notions about personal morality, rooted in the Hebrew-Christian religion, and of our notions about politics, going back to the Greco-Roman concept
of the- state6s Justice, therefore, means neither the esoteric
wisdom of Plato's philosopher king nor mere legality. As the
catalogues of fundamental principles given by all the great
representatives of natural law philosophy clearly show, the
higher law principles of natural law mirror the evolution of
the moral tradition of western civilization. Christianity, in
deepening the stoic teaching of a common brotherhood of man,
gave enormous strength to the postulate of equality whose
revolutionary force, though temporarily checked by the dogma
of original sin, has greatly affected and will continue to af64
fect our notions of political, social and economic justice.
61It is true, natural law philosophers concede, that "man himself is
subject to continuous evolution and change." But, they insist, so long
as these changes do not convert man into an entirely different creature,
man's rational and social nature will continue to furnish an objective
basis for absolutely binding rules of conduct. Ryan and Boland, op.
cit.2 supra.note 7, at p. 11.
6 The tendency towards a monistic theory is closely connected with
the changing attitude toward the myth of original sin, which was inaugurated by Humanism, but temporarily retarded by the Reformation.
On the connection between natural law philosophy of the Enlightenment
and Plato's idealism, see Cassirer, op. cit. supra note 21.

Jaeger, op. cit. supra note 13, at p. 323.
Troeltsch, Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne pro-

6s1
64

fane Naturrecht, 4 Gesammelte Schriften (1925); Troeltsnh, The Ideas
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Natural law philosophy has frequently been criticized for
calling these principles of morality law and for claiming that
propositions of positive law can be deduced from natural law
principles. Still, this way of looking at the legal systemnaive and one-sided as it is-expresses a profound insight
with regard to the constant interaction of law and morality.6
There is no society, to use the words of Knight, in which
its members obey the law from sheer self-interest
or purely because of "sanctions." They must be believed to be right in principle and, in the main. And
personal rulers are followed or officials obeyed because their position is accepted as first, legal, and
secondly, in accord with the law which itself is fundamentally "right." Social institutions must be in
harmony with what those who live under them think
to be moral-whatever theory one may hold as to
the causal relation in history between institutions
and moral ideas.6 ,
Law, to command obedience, has to live up to the "ethical
minimum" of a community. Furthermore, this critique of
natural law philosophy is based on the unwarranted assumption that our legal system is closed and complete. In reality,
due to the elasticity of the case law system, the courts are
given considerable leeway in shaping the law according to
their sense of justice, which in turn is influenced by the culof Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics, in 1 Gierke, Natural
Law and the Theory of Society (Barker's tr. 1934) 205; Lindsay, Individualism, 7 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1932 ed.) 674.
65 Positivists who insist that "it is to law that we owe the conception
of justice" have fallen into the opposite extreme, as the author of the
phrase seems to- admit. Llewellyn, Bramble Bush (1930) 121. For the
philosophical presuppositions of this point of view, see 2 Jhering, Der
Zweck im Recht (1883) 108 et seq.; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Selby-Bigge ed. 1896) 477. See also Brentano, The Origin of
the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (1902); Cohen, Ethik des Reinen
Willens (3 Aufl. 1941) 227 et seq.
66 Knight, Ethlcs and Economic Reform, I The Ethics of Liberalism,
6 Economica (N. S.) 1, 4 (1939); Soml6, Juristische Grundlehre (2 Aufl.
1927) §§ 33, 38; -butsee Laski Grammar of Politics (2nd ed. 1980 250.
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tural patterns of the community and the moral tradition.
Thus, the ideal is constantly becoming the positive. In the
light of this phenomenon, the importance of the question
whether the principles of higher law are really law, can easily
be exaggerated. In the evolution of the common law system
the opposition between positive and natural law is constantly
6T
overcome.
Natural law philosophy has always been realistic enough
to admit that the principles of natural law due to their generality need positive laws for their concretization and as a
guarantee of their effective enforcement. But it has always
been emphatic in its insistence that positive laws owe their
validity to this very fact. This grandiose belief is reflected
in the definitions of law given by natural law philosophers.
St. Thomas' definition of law is still unsurpassed. He defines law as "nothing else than the ordinance of reason for
the common good made by him who has care of the comPositive law, to be just, must
munity and promulgated."6
meet three requirements: it must serve the common good,
its burdens must be distributed according to proportionate
equality, and finally, it must be issued by a legislator within
69
the bounds of his authority.
In the light of this theory, positive laws which, due to
human error, are unjust in terms of the postulates of the
"higher law" present very serious problems. Are they invalid with the result that they need not be obeyed? Has the
citizen a right of resistance against unjust laws? Or is it
not better as Socrates has argued in Plato's Crito to obey
laws of a legitimate government than to bring all law into
disrepute and open the gate to anarchy? Natural law phi67

Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) 182 et seq.; Gurvitch,
The Problem-!f Social Law, 52 Ethics 17 (1941). For a discussion of
the philosophical problems involved, see Cohen, Reason and Nature
(1931) 408 et seq.; Robinson, Law and the Lawyers (1935) 218 et seq.
68St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, la, 2ae, q. 90 a. 4; id. q.
91 a. ..
69Ic. q. 90 a. 4; id.q. 96 a. 4.
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losophy by the dialectics of its own dogma of a higher law
was forced to affirm a right of resistance against unjust laws
and to proclaim that the just character of positive laws .is
not conclusively settled by the fact that they have been enacted by the proper authorities .and complied with by the
citizens. The principles of natural law bind rulers and subjects alike.
And yet this teaching has largely remained a programme,
and this fact has done much to discredit natural law philosophy. History has recorded many instances where the validity
of laws violating the moral tradition of western civilization
has remained unchallenged because-as the argument ranthe exercise of a right of resistance might be more injurious
to the common good than the abuse to be removed. 0 Furthermore, the attitude of the Catholic Church, which claims
to be the repository of natural law, with respect to fascism has
been quite ambiguous. 71 To be sure, the belief in absolute
principles of justice and inalienable hfiman rights did form a
most powerful ideological weapon in the hands of the political
philosophers of the middle class struggling for political freedom. But as soon as the fight was won, natural law in the
form of a theory of natural rights tended to become an instrument for the protection of vested interests against progressive
social legislation. No wonder that the reaction against natural law philosophy set in. In many quarters the conviction
began to grow that the philosophy of a higher law had exhausted its usefulness once its postulates had found their institutionalization in a bill of rights and other democratic institutions. Dissatisfaction with existing positive laws, liberals began to insist, should be voiced only through the legitimate channels provided for by the democratic system and
not by appeal to higher law principles. In taking this position, liberals do not overlook the possibility of a majority
7eSt. Thomas' conservative position is to be found in Summa Theologiae, la, 2ae, q. 96 a. 4; see also Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (1940)

129.
71Ryan and Boland, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 120 et 8eq.
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tyrannizing a minority, but they are convinced that the give
and take of free discussion guaranteed by civil liberties will
72
furnish the best protection of minority rights.
Natural law theory, it must be said on the basis of its history, has been used not only to strengthen "new historical
rights in the struggle of their becoming" (Croce), but also
to defend vested interests. In this respect its record is hardly
better than that of positivism. Serfdom, indeed the whole
feudal order, for instance, was accepted by St. Thomas, while
political equality was postulated by Bentham on utilitarian
grounds. The very fact that history has produced different
systems of natural law, all supposedly anchored in man's nature, and frequently the same institutions have been both defended and attacked in the name of natural law and of man's
reason, proves how little natural law philosophers have really
examined man's nature. To be sure, natural law philosophy
has shown real psychological insight in developing a dualistic
philosophy of law. The theory of the dual structure of the
legal system is an effort to reconcile idea and reality: our
external experience according to which all law is positive
law, and our inner experience which demands that all law
be anchored in the idea of justice."3 It is this very aspect
of natural- law philosophy which will keep it alive in our
imperfect world. The emotional appeal, enjoyed by natural
law philosophy today shows how desperate the need, for a
belief in absolutes has become even with people who do not
set their hopes in totalitarianism, and this belief will grow
in intensity the more people will feel that their own world
has failed them.
The rise of the totalitarian systems has made it clear that
democracy is not necessarily a security for that liberty which
72
Wertheimer, On the Concept of Democracy, in Ascoli and Lehmann,
Political and Economic Democracy (1937) 271; Knight, Ethics and
Economic Reform, III Christianity, 6 Economica (N. S.) 398, 408 (1939);
Knight, The Meaning of Democracy: Its Politics, Economic Stru6ture

and Ideals, Journal of Negro Education (1941) 318, 323.
7
8Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht I (1895) 120.
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man rightly desires; to overcome the deep sense of frustration which has taken hold of so many people and to combat
the resulting regressions to immature attitudes which threaten our civilization, political democracy, as we feel, has to be'
supplemented by an economic and social democracy. But this
is hardly enough. All great social reforms, heretofore, have
been impeded or have even miserably failed because of the
lack of a science of man. To bring the basic values of our
civilization nearer to realization, more than a magical belief
in natural law and in man's rational nature is necessary. To
be sure, man is a "rational animal," but it is also true that
he is constantly rationalizing irrational conduct, particularly
aggressions. Pascal's profound insight is still true:
L'homme n'est ni ange ni bate et le malheur veutque qui veut faire I'ange fait la, bate.74
To accept reason naively is to invite the advocates of totalitarianism to deny it blindly and to contend that the "driving force not only in man but in all things is a blind will, an
75
6lan vita.""
The spheres of our life are still divided and always will be
divided into realms of "logical" and "non-logical conduct"
(Pareto). The advocates of totalitarianism, making use of
this insight, appeal-to the irrational forces in man, to man's
immaturity and longing for security, and they try to convince him that he is unable to work out his own salvation but
has to be guided by authority:
La foi et le patriotisme sont les deux grands thaumaturges de ce monde. L'un et l'autre sont divins:
toutes leurs actions sont des prodiges; n'allez pas
leur parler d'examen, de choix, de discussion: ils
diront que vous blasphgmez; ils ne savent que deux
mots: soumission et croyance: avec ces deux leviers
74Pascal, Pens6es, no 358.
75

Morrow, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy, 52 Ethics

297, 306 (1942).

HeinOnline -- 19 Tul. L. Rev. 60 1944-1945

1944]

NATURAL LAW

ils soulZvent l'univers; leurs erreurs mgmes sont
76
sublimes.
To meet this challenge, we have to push the rationality of
scientific method further and further, though with patience,
into areas of individual and social life, until recently neglected; many of the obstacles to progress will be found there.
The advances of sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis
towards a science of human nature entitle us to be more hopeful as to the future. The psychoanalytical theory of Freud,
in particular, and its clinical findings, though constantly
liable to be maligned, have enormously deepened man's understanding of himself, his anxieties, the aggressiveness and
ambivalence of human nature. It has taught us not to overestimate conscious at the expense of unconscious processes.
The insights gradually obtained will equip modern educators
and social workers for doing their part in the liberation and
sublimation of psychological energies which are wastefully
locked up in the "repressive mechanism of the unconscious."1 7
In this way, we may be able to overcome the impasse created by
the pessimism of the revolutionaries who think that
things are so bad that nothing can save us but violent change, and the pessimism of the reactionaries
who regard the balance of our economic and social
life so precarious that we must risk no experiments.7 8
7
6De Maistre, ftude sur la Souverainet6, Oeuvres Compltes I (1884)
377.
7T Julian Huxley, in Waddington, Science and Ethics (1942) 85.
7SKeynes, Essays in Persuasion (1932) 359, 360.
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